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Introduction 
 
 
Prioritise Greenhouse Gas Neutrality 
EU and German Climate Policy Should Be More Ambitious and More Pragmatic 
Oliver Geden 
Two years after the climate summit in Paris, the euphoria over the diplomatic break-
through and adoption of new targets – holding the temperature increase to well below 
2 degrees Celsius, preferably even to 1.5 degrees – has largely evaporated. There has 
been little sign of additional ambition in climate change mitigation since. One funda-
mental problem is the global nature of temperature targets, which are little suited for 
generating concrete national action plans and not at all suited for evaluating emissions 
reduction measures implemented by governments or businesses. Starting with the “facili-
tative dialogue” being prepared at the Bonn climate summit for 2018, it is the third 
Paris mitigation target that should be the benchmark: namely to attain greenhouse-gas 
neutrality in the second half of the century. The European Commission and member 
states of the European Union (EU) should make the zero emissions target their central 
reference point in reformulating the Climate Roadmap 2050 and in adopting a long-
term decarbonisation strategy. This could provide the opportunity to redesign the EU’s 
climate policy so as to make it both more ambitious and more pragmatic. 
 
Until the Paris Agreement was adopted in 
December 2015, the United Nations (UN) 
climate change mitigation policy had only 
one objective: holding the temperature 
increase to below two degrees Celsius (°C). 
In Paris the target was slightly tightened 
(“well below 2 °C”), and, following pressure 
by developing countries, it was agreed to 
pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5 °C. The 21st Conference of 
Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also 
decided on a third climate-protection tar-
get, namely “to achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in 
the second half of this century” (Article 4). 
This statement is generally interpreted as 
targeting greenhouse gas neutrality or zero 
emissions. It does not mean that all emis-
sions without exception are to be reduced 
to zero. In some areas, this would be techni-
cally impossible (e.g. agriculture); in others 
it would be too complex or costly (e.g. avia-
tion). The term of balance, which is central 
to Article 4, refers to the concept of com-
pensating for residual emissions by using 
technologies that can extract emitted car-
bon dioxide from the atmosphere (carbon 
dioxide removal, CDR). 
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Unclear Hierarchy of Targets 
The conceptual hierarchy of the three miti-
gation targets remains unclear. The politi-
cal and scientific debate has so far been 
dominated by the two temperature targets. 
The text of the Paris Agreement also ex-
plicitly declares that the purpose of the 
zero emissions target is to meet the 2 °C 
and 1.5 °C objectives. Clearly, these tem-
perature targets can only be attained if 
global emissions do drop to zero eventually. 
However, the vague time frame of “in the 
second half of this century” leaves substan-
tial room for manoeuvre in climate policy. 
Nor has climate science unequivocally 
identified the point in time by which global 
greenhouse gas neutrality would have to be 
established to attain the Paris temperature 
targets. All statements on this subject are 
based on assumptions that the political 
sphere rarely reflects on, or in some cases 
does not even know. Not least, this is due to 
the way the temperature targets have been 
defined. Despite widespread assumptions to 
the contrary in climate policy, 1.5 °C can no 
longer be interpreted as a strict limit that 
must not be exceeded at any point: average 
temperatures have already risen by about 
1 °C above pre-industrial levels. All scien-
tific scenarios accept that there will be a 
temporary “overshoot” of the temperature 
threshold, but disagree about its extent 
and duration. 
Whilst the Paris Agreement is rightly 
viewed as a diplomatic breakthrough, little 
has happened since then in terms of the 
enormous mitigation challenges. While 
emissions have been basically flat between 
2014 and 2016, recent projections foresee 
an increase of 2 percent in 2017. Even in 
the unlikely event that all the Paris signa-
tories fulfil their voluntary national 
pledges, emissions would still be expected 
to continue rising until 2030. The UN en-
vironment programme UNEP predicts a 
temperature rise of 3.2 °C by 2100 – in 
other words, well above the agreed thresh-
olds – unless the current climate policy 
course is changed. 
Diffusion of Responsibility 
Long-term climate policy only works if it 
pursues ambitious objectives. These also 
need to be precise, evaluable, attainable 
and motivating, or they will remain ineffec-
tive. A problem-centred temperature target 
such as 2 °C can easily be communicated as 
the threshold to dangerous climate change. 
However, it clearly lacks the necessary char-
acteristics to actually guide the actions of 
governments and business as well. 
Even if targets such as “well below 2 °C” 
or 1.5 °C were defined more precisely – for 
instance, if no temporary overshoot was 
allowed for – it would not change the fact 
that temperature targets are directed at the 
earth system as a whole. They do not state 
the amount of emissions reductions any 
individual country is supposed to provide. 
It is therefore relatively easy for govern-
ments to support ambitious global targets 
while doing little against climate change in 
practice. Since the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) declines, with 
good reason, to deliver a scientific formula 
for fairly distributing mitigation obliga-
tions among individual states, every govern-
ment is able to declare confidently that 
its national pledges are in line with global 
temperature targets. As it stands, mitiga-
tion efforts can only be critically evaluated 
at the global level. However, no single coun-
try can be made responsible for the looming 
breach of the 2 °C or 1.5 °C target. 
The attainability of climate-policy objec-
tives is generally neglected as a factor, inter 
alia because the ostensible scientific vali-
dation of climate targets makes it difficult 
for policymakers and companies to disclose 
their pragmatic cost-benefit calculations. 
However, as in every other policy area, gov-
ernments also diminish their efforts in cli-
mate policy as soon as the economic and – 
often more importantly – the political cost 
of consistent target achievement seems too 
high. The extent to which the envisaged 
target is missed as a consequence tends to 
be of secondary importance to them. In the 
case of threshold values, such as 1.5 °C and 
2 °C, this has encouraged the problematic 
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scientific practice of not questioning the 
attainability of the targets at any cost – 
because that might reduce the motivation 
of politicians, scientists and the public to 
work towards an ambitious climate change 
mitigation policy. Instead of accepting that 
the remaining CO2 budgets will already 
be exhausted in five years (for 1.5 °C) and 
twenty years (for 2 °C), the budgets have 
been successively expanded by creating the 
possibility of “negative emissions”. Given 
the fact that CDR technologies are barely 
researched and lead a peripheral existence 
in climate policy, the CDR volumes assumed 
by climate economists – 670 to 810 giga-
tonnes CO2 by 2100 – look like a daring bet 
on the future. 
Steering Action 
Compared to temperature thresholds, tar-
geting greenhouse gas neutrality is notice-
ably more precise, easier to evaluate, 
politically more likely to be attained and 
ultimately more motivating too. Since this 
goal directly tackles the actions perceived 
as problematic, their effectiveness at steer-
ing policy can be expected to be much 
greater than “1.5 °C” or “well below 2 °C”. 
A zero emissions target shows the policy-
makers, the media and the public fairly 
precisely what needs to be done. If global 
greenhouse gas neutrality in the sense of 
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement is inter-
preted to mean that all signatories have to 
gradually reach “net zero” between 2050 
and 2100, then they must all be measured 
against the same yardstick. Any differen-
tiation between these obligations – for 
instance, between industrialised nations, 
emerging economies and developing coun-
tries – can only occur along the time axis. 
Under the “bottom-up” approach of the 
Paris Agreement, governments make that 
decision for themselves. 
Each country’s emissions must first peak 
(which is already the case for 49 of them), 
then continually decrease and finally attain 
zero. Measured against this target, it is easy 
to make mitigation action transparent – 
not just of national governments, but of 
cities, economic sectors and individual com-
panies as well. Whoever ignores the target 
will not be able to deceive others: it is rela-
tively easy to ascertain whether the respec-
tive emissions are going up or down. Wher-
ever greenhouse gas neutrality becomes 
the socially accepted norm, new fossil-fuel 
infrastructure would be very hard to justify. 
A zero emissions vision could also kickstart 
a race to reach the zero line before others. 
Some countries have already taken up the 
challenge. Sweden, for instance, hopes to 
reach zero by 2045. The United Kingdom 
has at least declared its willingness to an-
nounce its zero emissions target soon. 
Obviously, even a zero emissions target 
is no guarantee that all emissions reduction 
measures will be implemented as planned. 
Given the perspective of several decades, 
such a guarantee cannot exist. Since green-
house gas neutrality is primarily about 
setting a clear direction, rather than posit-
ing an imaginary border between “accept-
able” and “dangerous” climate change 
(namely 2 °C), its attainability is not a ques-
tion of either/or, but of sooner/later. It thus 
avoids definitive failure, which would have 
a demoralising political effect. 
Targeting zero emissions would provide 
clear and transparent directions for all rele-
vant actors. It would bring out inconsisten-
cies between talk, decisions and actions 
much more clearly than temperature objec-
tives such as 2 °C or 1.5 °C can. The UNFCCC 
should therefore give the target of green-
house gas neutrality much more weight in 
future. It could start with the facilitative dia-
logue planned for 2018, whose rules are be-
ing set at the COP23 in Bonn. The dialogue is 
intended to boost countries’ ambitions and 
to lead to strengthened ‘nationally deter-
mined contributions’ under the Paris Agree-
ment. 
Greenhouse Gas Neutrality as an 
EU Target 
For the EU – which, like Germany, currently 
pursues the target of reducing its emissions 
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by 80 to 95 percent by 2050 – zero emis-
sions would be the next logical step. Long-
standig climate policy pioneers cannot 
seriously question the principle of aiming 
for zero. But deciding on the exact timing 
would be politically controversial. Currently, 
it seems unrealistic for the EU to agree on 
2050 as a target year. 
In 2018 the debate about long-term EU 
climate targets should regain momentum, 
fostered by the new version of the Climate 
Roadmap first presented in 2011, which is 
expected in autumn 2018. The European 
Commission’s planning document follows 
the publication of the IPCC Special Report 
on the 1.5 °C target and should be seen as 
the European contribution to the “facili-
tative dialogue”, which will conclude in 
December 2018 at the COP24 in Katowice, 
Poland. However, it is not the Commission 
which will be making the decision on the 
EU’s new long-term strategy, to be submit-
ted to the UNFCCC by 2020. Its roadmap is 
merely a carefully calculated proposal. The 
final decision rests with EU member states; 
de facto it is likely to be made by the Euro-
pean Council. It is reasonable to suppose 
that the German Federal Government will 
champion an ambitious target at the EU 
level, which it will then transpose into its 
national climate policy as well. 
Setting a target of greenhouse gas neu-
trality would conceptually change Euro-
pean climate policy in two ways: it could 
become both more ambitious and more 
pragmatic. The target of an 80 to 95 percent 
emissions reduction (usually paraphrased 
in Germany as “extensive greenhouse gas 
neutrality”) allows many businesses and 
member states to see a substantial share 
of their emissions as part of the remaining 
five to 20 percent., to suggest that they are 
only partially affected by the current cli-
mate policy pathway. This is especially true 
for industries and member states where 
very ambitious reduction measures encoun-
ter substantial technological, economic or 
political obstacles. This constellation is also 
advantageous for proponents of “extensive 
greenhouse gas neutrality” in that they can 
focus their proposed solutions essentially 
on expanding renewables and increasing 
energy efficiency. They do not need to dis-
cuss unpopular and costly measures – such 
as capturing and storing CO2 in industrial 
processes, and using synthetic fuels or nega-
tive emissions technologies. A reduction tar-
get of 100 percent would push both sides out 
of their comfort zone and greatly increase 
the level of seriousness in climate policy. 
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